Talents for Low Intrigue

36 ballots on this day to elect a president

On this day, Feb. 17, in 1801, the U.S. House of Representatives resolved an electoral tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, electing Jefferson president. The crisis exposed the first great crack in the constitutional design. Though the founders were wise, they failed to foresee how presidential voting would actualize. The original Electoral College design failed to distinguish between votes for president and vice president—each elector cast two votes, the top finisher earning the presidency, the runner-up vice president. Jefferson and Burr ran on the same Republican ticket; Burr was the intended VP. But because every Republican elector dutifully cast votes for both men, they tied at 73 apiece. The system collapsed under the emergence of party tickets.

What did the founders envision? They imagined a pre-partisan meritocracy. Electors were distinguished local citizens exercising independent judgment. Here’s how Hamilton sold them in Federalist 68:

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration.

Hamilton, stumping for the ratification of the Constitution in the Federalist Papers, claimed that the Electoral College that was a part of the new system guaranteed virtuous presidents.¹

The assumption was that electors would each vote for the two most qualified individuals they could think of, regardless of faction. Washington's two unanimous elections made this seem plausible. Nobody designed for a world in which an organized party would hand its electors a two-name ticket and say "vote for both,” or in which no Federalist would vote for someone on the other team. By 1800 that world had arrived, and the machinery broke immediately.

This threw the election to the lame-duck, Federalist-controlled House — meaning the party that lost the election got to decide who won it. As you know from your devotion to musical theater, Alexander Hamilton-- no fan of Jefferson-- lobbied his fellow Federalists to support Jefferson over Burr, arguing at least that Jefferson had principles, while Burr had none. Hamilton called Burr "the most dangerous man in America." It took 36 ballots over six days before Jefferson prevailed.²

The 1801 crisis was resolved because a handful of Federalists decided that the machinery of self-government mattered more than factional advantage. Hamilton's argument wasn't "Jefferson is good." It was "Burr will break the system." The question that connects 1801 to now isn't really about whether the Electoral College filters for virtue — Hamilton committed a bloomer there. It's about whether a party can still produce people willing to act against their faction's short-term interest to preserve the institution.

This act of putting country over faction arguably cost Hamilton his life three years later, when Burr killed him in their famous duel. The Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, which separated the presidential and vice-presidential ballots — the system we still use today.

In sum: partisan loyalty overriding institutional intent, an enemy saving his rival for the good of the republic, and a murder that grew partly from the grudge.

1. So don’t worry that we’ve designed a system that will guarantee against electing a king or king-like figure.

2. Most Federalists in the House voted as a bloc for Burr — not out of affection for him, but to deny Jefferson the presidency or extract concessions from him. The deadlock held because Jefferson needed nine of sixteen state delegations, and the Federalists controlled enough of them to block him. The logjam finally broke when James Bayard of Delaware — who, as his state’s sole representative, was Delaware’s entire vote — decided to cast a blank ballot rather than keep voting for Burr. A handful of Federalists in other divided delegations did the same. That tipped enough states to Jefferson. Hamilton’s lobbying was central to convincing Bayard and others that Burr in the presidency was the worse outcome. So the 36 ballots were essentially a Federalist hostage negotiation that collapsed when enough of them accepted Hamilton’s argument.